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International law principles enable a rationalisation of the values to which the Union order 
aspires as a collective political and legal commitment amongst the Member States. The 
doctrine of Union law supremacy, which parallels that of international law supremacy, 
emphasises the overriding character of Union legal demands as a set of values and objectives 
over those of purely domestic origin. A common view that the Union legal order is sui generis 
or municipal in character fails to explain the directing character of the values underlying the 
Union project including its legal order.  
In this article I therefore explore and defend the view that the Union legal order is essentially 
one of international law. A central contention in this regard is that the supremacy of Union 
law obligations within the Member States is based on the principle of the supremacy of 
international law obligations over those originating in the domestic arena. The intensive 
rationalisation of this principle by the Court of Justice within its case law manages the 
intrusive domestic legal effects of the values and ideals found in the Union Treaties and 
illustrates the evolutionary character of the Union project.  
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The potential conflicts and collisions of systems that can in principle occur as 
between Community and Member States do not occur in a legal vacuum, but in a 
space to which international law is also relevant.1 
 
I will explore two strands of inquiry in this article. The first concerns an 
interrogation of the proposition that the activities of the Court of Justice form an 
expression of the doctrine of the supremacy of international over domestic legal 
rules. This doctrine has traditionally been subject to a number of qualifications 
peculiar to individual States, relating for example to the ability of a later domestic 
legislative provision to set aside an earlier conflicting rule of international law.2 In 
the Union setting however, qualifications associated with the doctrine have 
gradually diminished within Member States. These developments have been 
paralleled by an increase in the reach and influence of the supremacy doctrine where 
Union as opposed to ’traditional’ international law demands are concerned. The 
‘strength in depth’ of the [Union supremacy] doctrine is evident in relation to the 
variety of legal effects that have emerged within the Court’s judgments in relation to 
Union laws, the broadening of conditions relating to the ‘justiciability’ of Union 
legal rules and finally concerning the location of jurisdictional authority to decide 
upon the scope of the doctrine which arguably now lies de jure and de facto with the 
Court of Justice.  
 
A second strand of inquiry concerns a counter-intuitive feature of the defended 
international law character of Union legal ordering. Notwithstanding the Court’s 
apparently complex and expansive development of the supremacy doctrine giving 
effect to the legal demands of the Treaties, the Court of Justice has in fact adopted a 
restrictive approach to their articulation. The reason for this is that the values or 
objectives of the Union are open-ended. They are therefore subject to a medium or 
long-term process of realisation that takes place within a shifting and often charged 
political environment. As a result, the Court has consistently qualified and ‘managed’ 
the legal potential of the objectives set out in the Treaties so as to ensure the 
continued viability of Union legal demands within the Member States and hence that 
of the entire Union project.3   
  
The article will be structured as follows. I will consider first arguments for and 
against the international law character of the Union order, affirming the former 
position. Next, I will attempt to show that Union law, while rooted in the principles 
and practices associated with international law, represents a significant evolution of 
these principles. This is evident both in relation to the removal of qualifications 
previously applicable to international law effects in the domestic setting as well as in 
the location of the jurisdictional authority to determine these effects. Finally, I will 
consider how and why, notwithstanding these developments, the Court of Justice – 
and hence domestic courts when applying Union legal demands – have in fact 
adopted a markedly restrained approach towards their articulation given the 
profound political implications of a ‘fully integrated’ Europe mandated under the 
Treaties as a matter of international law.   
                                                 
1 N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 120.  
2 The lex posteriori derogat lex priori principle, whose application (and rejection by the Court of 
Justice) in the context of a Union law demand was considered in Case 106/77 Italian Finance 
Administration v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
3 For example by limiting the circumstances in which direct effects may arise. 




2. THE UNION: INTERNATIONAL, SUI GENERIS OR MUNICIPAL TYPE 
OF LEGAL ORDER? 
 
The prevailing view concerning the nature of the European Union legal order is that 
it is sui generis in character given the institutional characteristics it shares with both 
international and municipal orders.4 According to this view, it is said that the 
extensive regulatory scope, legislative and adjudicatory independence and rule of 
law character of the Union order all indicate its unique character which represents a 
departure from ordinary principles of international law. It is generally agreed that 
the origins of the European Union (originally the European Communities) are to be 
found in public international law.5 However, the international law basis of the Union 
as a dynamic, evolutionary body of ‘governmental’ institutional practices has been 
called into question by both the Court of Justice and academic commentators. In its 
Van Gend en Loos judgment the Court refers to the Union as a new type of 
international legal order.6 Similar positions have been taken by Member State 
courts.7 Academics have also sought to distinguish Union from international law, 
focussing upon the alleged constitutionalisation of Union legal demands. As Weiler 
notes,  
 
‘[m]ost commentators focus on the legal doctrines of supremacy of European law, 
the direct effect of European law, implied powers and pre-emption, and on the 
evolution of the protection of fundamental human rights as hallmarks of this 
“constitutionalisation”.’8  
 
Weiler himself questions whether the distinction between international and 
constitutional legal ordering is a relevant one, suggesting instead that:  
 
[a]ssuming the distinction between an international and a constitutional order 
makes any sense at all . . . we would prefer to focus on the following features that 
distinguish the European legal order from public international law: the different 
hermeneutics of the European order, its system of compliance, which renders 
European law in effect a transnational form of “higher law” supported by enforceable 
judicial review, as well as the removal of traditional forms of state responsibility 
from the system.9  
 
                                                 
4 See for example J H H Weiler and U R Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – 
Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37 Harv.Int'l L.J. 411.  
5 ‘[t]he origins, powers and objectives of the three Communities are all to be found in international 
treaties.’      J F McMahon, ‘The Court of the European Communities: Judicial Interpretation and 
International Organisation’ (1961) 37 Brit.YB Int'l L 320, 329. Weiler and Haltern have noted that, 
‘[t]here is no doubt that the European legal order started its life as an international organisation in 
the traditional sense, even if it had some unique features from its inception.’ J H H Weiler and U R 
Haltern (n 5) 419.  
6 The Court stated in its Van Gend en Loos judgment that ‘The Community constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.’ Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 
1.    
7 For domestic cases that have affirmed the sui generis character of the Union legal order, see J H H 
Weiler and U R Haltern (n 5) 421. 
8 J H H Weiler and U R Haltern (n 5) 411, 420 citing G F Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for 
Europe’ (1989) 26 CMLR 595 and E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution’ (1981) 73 AJIL 1. 
9 Ibid. 
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A further consideration militating against the international law character of the 
Union order is its ‘governmental’ institutional framework and associated conferred 
powers. In this regard, the Treaties provide for a supranational institutional 
framework empowered to both legislate and provide legally binding adjudication10 in 
relation to the various economic and social objectives they contain. The institutional 
practices of the Union moreover directly impact on individuals’ rights and 
obligations within the domestic arena. Accordingly, Mark Jones notes that,  
 
. . . there are two relevant, fundamental distinctions between the objectives of 
Community Law and those of more traditional international law. First, the legal 
position of individuals is modified not just by the Treaties themselves, but also by 
the exercise of governmental powers conferred upon the Community institutions by 
the Treaties. Second, the Treaties and the powers they confer are concerned with 
modifying the legal position of individuals over an extremely wide range of 
economic and social activities.11 
 
Weiler also highlights the Union’s institutional structure as being characterised not 
by ‘ . . . general principles of public international law, but by a specified interstate 
governmental structure defined by a constitutional charter (the Treaties) and 
constitutional principles.’12 Do then these features of the Union legal order noted by 
Weiler and Jones undermine the claim that the jurisdiction conferred under the 
Treaties can be understood in terms of international law principles? In short, does 
the directly applicable and supreme character of Union laws, its governmental 
institutional framework, wide ranging jurisdiction, and claimed rule of law basis 
underline its sui generis or even municipal law character? I will contend that these 
features do not n fact compromise the Union orders’ essentially international law 
basis.  
 
3. THE UNION AS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
 
The claim defended is that the Union order is properly understood as a species of 
international law notwithstanding its developed institutional structure and extensive 
jurisdictional scope. The intrusive nature of the Union legal order within Member 
State jurisdictions does not require any departure from established international law 
principles. The supremacy of Member States’ legal obligations arising as a matter of 
international law, can fully explain the domestic legal effects of Union laws and 
hence the relationship between Union and domestic legal orders. To make out these 
claims requires that I counter the arguments raised above – concerning the 
supremacy and direct applicability of Union laws on the one hand and the 
sophisticated governmental institutional framework underlying Union governance 
on the other – and offer a credible affirmation of its international law quality. 
Dealing with each of these points in turn.  
 
First, the sui generis character of the Union legal order is attributed to the supremacy 
and direct effect doctrines which relate in turn to the overriding character of Union 
over domestic legal demands and the ability of individuals to rely upon or invoke 
Union legal demands before domestic courts. Do these features however actually 
represent a departure from established international law principles? For Spiermann, 
                                                 
10 Arts 267 and 258 TFEU. 
11 M L Jones, ‘The Legal Nature Of The European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis Using H 
L A Hart’s Model of Law and A Legal System’ (1984) 17 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 28 (emphasis in original).  
12 J H H Weiler,‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2407.  
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‘There is however no doubt that under international law, a national court, being an 
organ of the State, is obliged to reach decisions that are in accordance with the 
international obligations of the State . . .’13 furthermore, ‘ . . . in modern international 
law, interests in the subject matter governed by a rule normally breed rights (to lay 
claims and bring actions) on the basis of the rule, also for individuals.14  
 
The fact that domestic courts are bound in effect to uphold Union laws and that 
these laws are capable of modifying the legal rights or obligations of individuals 
before domestic courts does not of itself represent a principled departure from 
international law principles. It may be replied to this that while the ‘defining’ legal 
doctrines, of Union law supremacy and direct effect, are entirely familiar to 
international law, their expansive character within the Union setting does in fact 
represent a significant advance in jurisdictional authority associated with 
international law regimes. This is correct; however, the expansive character of the 
Union jurisdiction does not however of itself compromise the Union’s international 
law pedigree unless we can find a principled justification of the distinction between 
municipal and international jurisdictions based upon the extent of jurisdictional 
authority alone. Given that there is no inherent limitation on either the scope or 
subject matter of international law agreements, such a justification for maintaining a 
principled distinction between the Union order and international law is likely to fail.  
 
Does then the Union’s governmental institutional character suggest the sui generis 
character of its legal order? In terms of the ability of domestic institutions to control 
or manage Union institutional demands, these demands are far-reaching by 
comparison with those arising under international law treaties generally. In 
addition, it is correct to say that the scope and claimed rule of law basis of these 
demands does represent a serious challenge to the jurisdictional claims of domestic 
orders. Finally, the ability to authoritatively interpret the substantive meanings of 
the Treaties being vested in a supranational judicial institution15, the Court of 
Justice, is arguably a departure from the historically accepted prerogative of 
domestic executive or judicial branches of signatory states to do so.16 These features 
once again do not in my view undermine the Union’s international law pedigree, for 
the following reasons.  
 
Any claim as to the ‘distinctiveness’ of the Union order as a result of its 
‘governmental’ institutional structure including legislative, executive17 and 
                                                 
13 O Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the European 
Community Legal Order’ (1999) 10 EJIL 763, 770.    
14 Ibid. 
15 Although recourse to international tribunals is now more common in relation to individual Treaty 
agreements. See for example the remit of the WTO tribunals to provide authoritative rulings on the 
GATT agreements.    
16 So for example, in relation to practices of US courts, Morgenstern has noted that, ‘[...] a treaty, as 
part of the law of the land can be interpreted by the courts, but great weight will be given to the view 
of the executive.’      F Morgenstern, ‘Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law’ 
(1950) 27 Brit.YB Int'l L. 42, 79. The view that within the domestic setting, it is the executive as 
opposed to the judicial branch that may provide authoritative rulings on a Treaty’s meaning has 
however been called into question by the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Chevrol v 
France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 159 where it was held that the determination of rights arising under 
public international law must, in order to comply with fundamental procedural guarantees contained 
in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, be made by the judicial as opposed to 
executive branches of States.  
17 The executive activities of the Union are shared by the Commission, which is the dominant 
institution in this regard, and the Council of Ministers.  
 VOLUME 5  EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
 109 
adjudicatory branches does not mean that its international law character is somehow 
altered. This would require acceptance of the proposition that, at a certain degree of 
institutional complexity, an international legal order loses its character as such. This 
proposition however confuses the core characteristics of international legal order 
with those of legal orders generally. The distinguishing features of international 
legal orders are a focus on the achievement of specific objectives or a commitment to 
the realisation of more broadly drawn social welfare outcomes within a limited 
jurisdictional sphere or a combination of both possibilities, by a number of 
cooperating States by way of Treaty agreements.  
 
Legal orders as a generic category are evidenced by the existence of an institutional 
governmental framework operating in legislative, executive and judicial capacities 
and governed by values associated with the rule of law. To the extent that an 
institutional order possesses these features, it will be regarded as a ‘developed’ legal 
order. The fact that an international legal order which by definition pursues specified 
and jurisdictionally contained objectives, does so by means of an institutional 
framework which shares features with developed, rule of law legal orders does not 
mean that it has departed from its international law basis. The Union order involves 
institutional practices collectively directed to the achievement of the objectives 
contained in the Union Treaties. These are the establishment of the common market 
and the gradual harmonisation of the social and economic policies of the Member 
States under the overall rubric of closer European integration. The fact that these 
objectives are supported by complex institutional structures governed by rule of law 
principles certainly gives an impression of a municipal-type order. However this can 
be seen as evidence of the extent to which the Member States have been willing to 
obligate themselves as a matter of international law to the realisation of these 
objectives. 
 
Next, it is fully in accordance with international law principles that a supranational 
institution in the Court of Justice and not domestic constitutional courts should 
possess authority to adjudicate on the substance, status and scope of Union law 
obligations. Member States may not agree with the results where this extends 
Union legal demands beyond what they see as the competences conferred by the 
Treaties. However, there is no doubt that as a matter of international law, this is 
precisely the institutional role conferred on the Court by the Treaties. As Weiler 
notes, ‘ . . . the European Court, in adopting its position on judicial Kompetenz 
Kompetenz, was not following any constitutional foundation but rather an orthodox 
international law rationale.’18 Moreover, domestic courts have on the whole 
recognised the final authority of the Court of Justice to rule on the legal demands 
arising under the Treaties, thereby accepting the supreme character of the body of 
Union obligations and rights in accordance with the principle of international law 
supremacy.19  
 
                                                 
18 J H H Weiler and U R Haltern (n 5) 411, 415. 
19 In Hartian terms, the recognition of the various international law features of the Union order – 
Union law supremacy and direct effects as well as the authority of the Court of Justice as the final 
arbiter of the scope, meaning and legal effects of Union legal norms – has emerged as a Rule of 
Recognition within Member State legal orders. See Jones, ‘The Legal Nature of the European 
Community’. Interpretations of the effects of Union laws by the Court of Justice will apply as binding 
legal authority across all the Member States, see the Advocate General’s opinion in Cases C-10/97 
Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE. ’90 Srl [1998] ECR I-6307.   
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Finally, the fact that the Union possesses legislative competence in relation to the 
matters set out in the Treaties does not support an argument that the Union is 
closer to a municipal or sui generis order than one of international law simpliciter. The 
fact that the Union may enact directly applicable laws that (as such) take automatic 
effect within the Member States undoubtedly represents a significant advance upon 
the ability of international law norms to take domestic legal effects. In this regard, 
the Treaties transfer legislative authority to the institutions created under the 
Treaties themselves in order to achieve the aims they contain. We may accordingly 
assume that the Member States are empowered as a matter of international law to 
confer this authority. It is counter-intuitive to suppose that the resulting obligations 
arising as a matter of Union legislation, and equivalent in status to the Treaty 
articles as far as domestic orders are concerned, are not themselves norms of 
international law.20 The legislative competences of the Union rather evidence a 
supranational competence to create legal obligations that possess the character of 
international law. That is, they are supreme over all aspects of domestic legal 
ordering and operate in the service of the ideals or objectives found in the Treaties.  
 
To sum up, the allegedly municipal features of the Union legal order identified by 
Weiler and Jones inter alia do not represent a principled departure from the 
international law character of the Union. Any principled distinction between 
international and municipal law does not rely on the presence or otherwise of 
developed institutional structures. Nor does it depend on whether institutions 
created under international agreements possess sovereign powers transferred from 
domestic jurisdictions beyond some (un)defined level. Nor finally does the 
distinction depend on the scope or status of legal effects promulgated and 
adjudicated upon by supranational institutions. The key elements of an international 
legal order are that all legal demands arising thereunder prevail over all domestic 
regulation and directed to the achievement of defined objectives set out in Treaty 
agreements among a collectivity of States, including the possibility of the 
independent institutional promotion of these objectives through the exercise of 
conferred powers. At this point, the question remains however as to whether the 
expansive character of the Union’s legal jurisdiction adds something to our 
understanding of the operation of international law and specifically of the role of 
supranational courts charged with determining the legal effects of a highly intrusive 
international law jurisdiction.  
 
4. THE EXPANSIVE CHARACTER OF THE UNION’S INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JURISDICTION 
 
The Court of Justice possesses competence under the Treaties and hence as a matter 
of international law to ensure that ‘ . . . in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed’21 The Court therefore determines the status and scope 
                                                 
20 In this respect, Weiler’s contention in relation to the direct effects of Union laws that these ‘[...] 
reversed the normal presumption of public international law [that] . . . if the state fails to bestow the 
rights [conferred by Treaty], the individual cannot invoke the international obligation, unless 
internal constitutional or statutory law, to which public international law is indifferent, provides for 
such a remedy’ is contradictory. If internal law were entirely independent of international law then it 
could not possibly allow the invocation of international law obligations before domestic courts unless 
these are said to operate as two wholly independent and distinct jurisdictions. This is plainly not the 
case. Indeed it is the very incorporation of Union law obligations within domestic orders that 
underlies the viability of the Union’s legal jurisdiction. J H H Weiler,‘The Transformation of Europe’ 
(1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2413-2414. 
21 Art 19 TEU. 
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of the legal obligations that flow from the application of Union laws and hence the 
legal effects deriving from the doctrine of Union law supremacy. The Court’s 
institutional role conferred under the Treaties represents a significant transfer of 
jurisdictional authority, previously associated with domestic courts, to determine the 
legal effects of international law norms. This jurisdictional transfer has been 
‘reflected back’ to domestic courts, with the Court counter-intuitively increasing the 
authority of domestic courts by enabling them to act as de facto ‘Union courts’ 
thereby exercising a constitutional power of review over all norms of domestic 
origin in light of all Union law requirements.22   
 
 In seeking to promote the substantive aims and objectives found in the Treaties, and 
in according these a supreme status over domestic law, the Court self-evidently acts 
as an international tribunal. In this regard, a feature of the Treaties that has allowed 
the development of a nuanced and hence viable portrayal of the supremacy doctrine 
by the Court of Justice is that the Treaties contain a combination of aspirational 
objectives relating to European integration and precise or ‘hard’ legal rights and 
obligations designed to put these aspirations into effect. This has allowed the 
affirmation of a regulatory framework within the Member States that factually 
supports the Union’s underlying integrationist values while at the same time 
permitting these values to possess a direct legal influence as interpretive authority 
over all areas of legal regulation that possess a connection with the Treaty 
objectives. This brings us to closer consideration of the legal effects taken by Union 
legal rules.  
 
4.1 Justicialblity Factors I: The Legal Effects of Union Norms 
 
The legal effects taken by Union norms within the Member States depend on a 
number of factors, some of which, for example in relation to issues of justiciability 
also apply in the determination of the legal effects of laws of domestic origin. These 
factors may be summarised as follows. The first is whether a legal standard concerns 
subject matter that is suitable for judicial determination, a test of institutional 
suitability. This includes the questions of the legislator’s intent (the Member States 
where the Union Treaties are concerned), the subject matter under consideration 
(which subjects are properly the subject of judicial as opposed to executive or 
legislative determination), as well as broader issues relating to the role of the 
judiciary in a rule of law system of governance.23 Second, whether a measure 
provides sufficient linguistic certainty (in identifying legal rights or obligations), the 
test of linguistic suitability. Third, whether further implementing measures are 
needed in order to put a measure into effect, the test of (un)conditionality.24 In each 
of these areas, a single, definitive test is impossible to identify. What may be 
                                                 
22 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame [1989] 2 CMLR 353. 
23 A Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (The Bobbs-
Merrill Company. Inc. Indianapolis, New York, 1962). 
24 These factors are equally applicable in the domestic setting regarding the suitability of domestic 
norms for judicial application. Carlos Vazquez has noted therefore that '[t]hese questions are not 
unique to treaties. The lack of “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” is often cited as 
bearing on whether statutory or constitutional provisions are judicially enforceable.’ C Vazquez, ‘The 
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’ (1995) 89 AJIL 695, 714 (footnote omitted).  In this 
regard, Vazquez, in considering factors that US courts have looked to in deciding whether Treaty 
provisions are ‘self-executing’ and hence give rise to enforceable individual rights, has noted that ‘[...] 
courts have examined under the “self-execution” rubric various concepts that are not unique to 
treaties. These include matters such as whether the claim is justiciable, whether the litigant has 
standing, and whether the litigant has a right of action’. Ibid 711.  
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observed is that justiciability requirements may vary according to the type of legal 
effects taken (by Union laws). As a result, the Court’s portrayal of the justiciability of 
Union norms and their consequent legal effects has been central to its development 
of the supremacy doctrine.25  
 
In this regard, the Court has maximised the impact of Union law over domestic 
orders, by developing a variety of possible legal effects attributable to binding Union 
laws. These include direct effect in the ‘narrow’26 sense of freestanding, individually 
enforceable rights, legality review effects and finally indirect or interpretive effects. 
Cumulatively these legal possibilities have been allied to an evolutionary and 
complex expression of the supremacy doctrine by the Court and hence the fullest 
possible expression of the underlying values of the Treaties by Union and domestic 
courts. In relation to ‘direct effects’27, the most intrusive of Union law effects, the 
Court stated in Becker that Union provisions must be ‘sufficiently precise and 
unconditional’ to give rise to enforceable individual rights.28 For the legality review 
effects of Union norms to arise, these conditions will generally not need to be met29 
providing that an ‘identifiable conflict’ between Union and domestic provision(s) is 
present.30 Finally, in relation to the interpretive effects of Union laws, we find that 
criteria of linguistic certainty do not play any part in determining whether these 
effects arise.31 This enables the broad concerns of European integration, set out in 
the opening Treaty articles tol create legal effects.  
 
4.2 Justiciability Factors II: Linguistic Certainty, Political Questions and the 
Intent of the Member States  
                                                 
25 In his analysis of the self-executing / non self-executing distinction set out in US court judgments 
relating to the internal applicability of Treaty norms, Carlos Vazquez notes that, ‘[...] the self-
execution “doctrine” addresses at least four distinct types of reasons why a treaty might be judicially 
unenforceable. First, a treaty might be judicially unenforceable because the parties [...] made it 
judicially unenforceable. This is primarily a matter of intent. Second, a treaty might be unenforceable 
because the obligation it imposes is of a type that, under our system of separated powers, cannot be 
enforced directly by the courts. This branch of the doctrine calls for a judgment concerning the 
allocation of treaty-enforcement power a between the courts and the legislature. Third, a treaty might 
be judicially unenforceable because the treaty makers lack the constitutional power to accomplish by 
treaty what they purported to accomplish. This branch of the doctrine calls for a judgement about the 
allocation of legislative power between the treaty makers and the lawmakers. Finally, a treaty 
provision might be judicially unenforceable because it does not establish a private right of action and 
there is no other legal basis for the remedy being sought by the party relying on the treaty’. Ibid 722-
3.  
26 A broad understanding of direct effectiveness refers to the invocability of Union norms in a 
domestic context so as to create legal effects that fall short of the direct conferral of rights. On the 
difference between broad and narrow definitions of direct effect, see Craig and de Burca, EU Law (3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 178 ff.  
27 In the ‘narrow’ sense of the recognition of freestanding Union rights, enforceable by individuals 
before domestic courts. 
28 Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 para 25 of the judgment. 
29 See inter alia, Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernaldez [1996] ECR I-1829. For contrary judicial dicta, see 
the Court’s judgment in CIA, which suggested that in order for the legality review (exclusionary) 
effects of a directive to arise in a horizontal situation, the conditions for direct effect must be met. 
Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA [1996] ECR I-220.  
30 See K Lenaerts and T Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of 
EU Law’ (2006) 31 E L Rev.   
31 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, particularly 
paras 24 and 25 in which the Court held that the Treaty competition rules prohibiting abuse of a 
dominant position in the market had to be interpreted in light of the overall objectives of the Treaty 
contained in the opening articles which affirmed the promotion of the common market amongst the 
Member States.  




Within the context of the determination of the legal effects of Treaty norms by 
domestic courts generally, the linguistic clarity of a provision of international law 
will often be linked to the question of whether the substantive topic raised is one 
suitable for determination by courts as opposed to other institutional branches. For 
example, Vazquez has suggested that in relation to the treatment of Treaty rules by 
US courts, ‘precatory’, ‘hortatory’ or aspirational provisions will not be self-
executing as they evidence a commitment to achieve certain objectives in the 
political arena as opposed to an intention to confer legally enforceable rights:  
 
“Precatory” treaty provisions are deemed judicially unenforceable not because of the 
parties’ (or anyone’s) intent, but because what the parties agreed to do is considered 
in our system of separated powers, a “political” task not for the courts to perform.32  
 
For the Court of Justice, the determination of whether a norm reveals a ‘political’ 
question that is as such not suitable for judicial enforcement requires a broader 
judgment, one that addresses its role in relation to both the other Union institutions 
as well as the Member States. In addition, for the Court, so far as the legal effects of 
the aspirational provisions of the Union Treaties are concerned, the distinction 
between vaguely worded aspirations and those that are ‘sufficiently precise’, relates 
as noted above, to the type of legal effect produced as opposed to being determinative 
of the question of whether legal effects may arise. The proposition that all objectives 
of the Union project are capable of creating legal effects is supported by the first 
articles of the Treaties. These objectives are worded in mandatory terms. Article 3 (3) 
TEU for example states that:  
 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat 
social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, 
equality between women and men; solidarity between generations and protection of 
the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and 
solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
enhanced.33 
 
This wording evidences an intention on the part of the Member States, that the 
overall objectives of the Union – in addition to the precise regulatory demands 
arising under Treaties and associated secondary legislation, should be able to create 
legal effects notwithstanding that these objectives undeniably fall under the heading 
of ‘political questions’. Moreover, from the perspective of the Court of Justice, the 
political objectives found in the Treaties are precisely those matters to which the 
‘hard’ or precise legal provisions of the Treaties are directed to achieving. All legal 
regulation arising under the Treaties is directed in some way to the achievement of 
the social, economic and political ideals, of European integration. For the Court of 
Justice therefore, as well as domestic courts, the institutional considerations relevant 
to whether a Union law is justiciable require a reformulation of the political tasks 
                                                 
32C Vazquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties (1995) 89 AJIL 695, 712. 
33 Art 3 TEU (emphases added). 
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doctrine noted by Vazquez above and based on received notions of the separations of 
powers between the courts and other domestic governmental branches.  
 
Union law effects within the domestic setting entail a modified understanding of the 
separation of powers doctrine, one that seeks the constitutionalisation of the body of 
Union laws through the activities of domestic courts. Such practices redefine the 
domestic judicial role in relation to the other governmental branches and are in 
contrast to the manner in which domestic courts have determined the internal legal 
effects of international treaties outside the Union context. Here, domestic courts 
seized with questions of international law will focus exclusively on the separation of 
powers doctrine embodied within the constitutional settlement of the State 
concerned without considering how international law measures may themselves 
qualify or alter that settlement.34 Finally, in relation to questions of intent, the Court 
of Justice does not consider the intentions of the Member States in assessing the 
legal effects of the Union provisions it is called on to interpret and apply. Instead it 
will assess the language of a provision in light of the overall purposes of the 
Treaties. In this regard, a ‘general’ interpretive assumption is that all individual 
Union measures are intended by the Member States collectively to fit within the 
overall scheme of the Union legal order, which is based on the achievement of the 
Treaty objectives.  
 
In sum, the suggestion that: ‘Where the line is drawn between “precatory” [and 
hence judicially unenforceable] and “obligatory” [and hence judicially enforceable] 
treaty provisions is a matter of domestic constitutional law’35 is revised in the Union 
setting. This revision concerns on the one hand the ability of the Court to 
authoritatively determine the meaning of Union Treaty provisions and secondary 
Union laws, and on the other its active constitutionalisation of Union norms within 
the domestic arena.36 This evolution of the doctrine of international law supremacy 
by the Court of Justice in upholding the supremacy of Union over domestic legal 
requirements does not represent a decisive break from the Union’s international law 
basis but rather expresses illustrates an organic expression of principles of 
international law.  
 
To sum up these points, we may say that all the Member States, whether monist or 
dualist in their approaches to international law have duly incorporated, according to 
the terms of their respective constitutions, the Union legal order as a directly 
applicable system of supreme legal rules that exists alongside laws of domestic 
                                                 
34 For these reasons, Marc Amstutz, speaking of the Court’s practices in relation to the interpretive 
effects taken by Directives notes that ‘t]he thoroughly courageous decision to intervene at the level 
of the rules governing legal reasoning (where the link between text setting and text interpretation is 
made) and – propter unitatem juris – extend the law-making powers of the national judiciaries beyond 
the contra legem boundary drawn by long-established legal theory (and thus into the legislative 
sphere defined mirror wise by the same legal tradition) is [...] a socially adequate (albeit also highly 
risky) alternative strategy.’ M Amstutz, ‘Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal 
Reasoning’ (2005) 11 ELJ 766, 777-8. 
35 C Vazquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’ (1995) 89 AJIL 695, 713. 
36 In this regard, Jones has noted that, ‘[...] the Court consistently has resisted arguments by the 
national governments that, in accordance with the practice of international law, the question of 
penetration [of Union laws within the domestic setting] is to be determined by national 
constitutional law. The practices of Member States vary considerably and, therefore, any solution 
based on the provisions of traditional national constitutional law will not ensure the full and uniform 
application of Community Law in all the Member States’. M L Jones, ‘The Legal Nature of the 
European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis Using H.L.A.Hart’s Model of Law and a Legal 
System’ (1984) 17 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 45 (footnotes omitted).  
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origin. The fact of incorporation does not however conclude the legal effects of Union 
norms, a fact illustrated by the gradual evolution of the doctrine of Union law 
supremacy by the Court of Justice and its corresponding acceptance within the 
Member States. The evolving quality of Union law effects within the Member States 
highlights the potential inherent in the Union jurisdiction within Member States. In 
practice, this potential has been far from realised as a result of an attitude of restraint 
by the Court of Justice towards the legal demands arising under the Treaties. 
Reasons for this restraint are explored in the following section. 
 
4.3 The Restrictive Expression of Union law demands by the Court of Justice 
 
The ability of the Court of Justice to promote the Treaty aims depends on the extent 
to which its conclusions regarding the supremacy of Union over domestic law are 
accepted by domestic courts. In this regard, Union law supremacy represents a 
‘value’ whose promotion and articulation by the Court of Justice and recognition by 
domestic courts is crucial to realisation of the Union project.37 In common with the 
Court’s challenge to the incumbent role of domestic courts under pre-existing 
separation-of-powers arrangements, the Court’s presentation of the supremacy of 
Union law represents an invitation or challenge to domestic judicial practices 
regarding their treatment of international legal norms. This does not mean that the 
international law character of Union legal obligations is somehow qualified. 
However, the need to ensure uniform Union law effects while developing the Treaty 
aims has required the careful ‘management’ of the (supremacy) doctrine by the Court 
of Justice  
 
Given the character of the legal obligations set out in the Treaties, backed by an 
independent and sophisticated institutional framework, a significant untapped 
potential exists in relation to the domestic effects of Union laws as a matter of 
international law. The legal obligations placed on the Member States under the 
Treaties are in fact more extensive than the portrayal of these obligations by the 
Court of Justice. The Court has in fact offered a moderate and limited expression of 
Union legal demands. In relation to the pace and extent of European integration, the 
Court has vouchsafed the continued development of the Union by remaining 
responsive to a political imperative that concerns the acceptability of its legal 
demands within the Member States.  
 
The Court of Justice has been faced not only with ensuring that ‘ . . . in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’38 but also with the 
need to maintain the viability and indeed survival of the Union’s intrusive 
international law jurisdiction. Recognising that the full import of the Treaties’ legal 
demands would be unacceptable to the Member States and hence practically 
unenforceable, the Court has therefore developed the doctrine of Union law 
supremacy by reference to what it deems institutionally possible. While this has 
entailed an expansive engagement by domestic courts by comparison with other 
legal demands of international law origin, the Court’s articulation of the Treaty 
demands has at the same time been consistently restrained. It has advanced the 
doctrine of Union law supremacy in incremental steps, consistently maintaining a 
limited view of the legal obligations found in the Treaties.  
  
                                                 
37 Famously in its Van Gend and Costa judgments. 
38 Art 19 TFEU. 
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The Court of Justice’s allegedly dynamic and extensive approach to Treaty 
interpretation then obscures the fact that the legal possibilities represented by the 
Treaties as a matter of international law are in fact diminished by political, legal and 
jurisdictional concerns that prevent their full expression. The Court’s case 
judgments reveal a ‘thin’ interpretive approach to the principle of international law 
supremacy where the legal effects of the Treaties are concerned. The articulation of 
Union law demands by the Court therefore represents as noted above, a managed, 
challenge to the jurisdictional expectations of domestic courts. In addition, as 
pointed out by Spiermann, given that the Member States have signed up to a project 
of international cooperation in the Union Treaties that has clear potential to 
challenge incumbent notions of State sovereignty, the Court has highlighted the 
relevance of State sovereignty in developing the Treaties’ legal effects, an approach 
he traces to the Court’s judgments in Costa and Wilhelm39: 
 
. . . as in Costa v ENEL, in Wilhelm, state sovereignty was treated as a key ingredient 
of treaty interpretation, essentially because the Court by then had recognised such a 
strong position of national law in regulating market structures that the Treaty was 
binding only within the context of national law, thus making precedence an 
appropriate synonym of [the international law principle of] pacta sunt servanda.40  
 
The recognition of domestic legal regulation and hence the potential for conflict 
between Union and domestic law by an international tribunal is, as pointed out by 
Spiermann, unusual from an international law perspective given that, ‘[f]rom the 
point of view of international law, there can be no conflict between a treaty rule and 
a national law rule, for the rules do not belong to the same system.’41 The Court has 
affirmed, in Spiermann’s view, a ‘national lawyers’ perspective on the relationship 
between international (Union) and domestic law, a perspective that prioritises what 
he terms the international law of co-existence.42 This approach emphasises (the role 
of) domestic sovereignty in defining a States’ international law obligations without 
recognising the possibility of an unconditional joint limitation of sovereignty, a 
possibility which is an established feature of what Spiermann terms the international 
law of co-operation.43 Under the former approach, the emergence of the Union 
doctrines of supremacy and direct effect indeed evidence a ‘new’ kind of legal order 
but only by reference to what Spiermann terms a ‘narrow’ understanding of 
international law. 44 This however neglects possibilities found within the 
international law of cooperation which represents a more credible understanding of 
                                                 
39 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR-I. For consideration of the 
judgment in this case, see J Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) 265-6. 
40 O Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the European 
Community Legal Order’ (1999) 10 EJIL 763, 785.  
41 Ibid at 773 citing Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties according to which: 
‘[m]unicipal law may not be invoked as a justification for failure to perform international 
obligations’. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23rd May 1969, entered into force 
27th January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.  
42 ‘[T]he ahistorical idea of international law embraced by the Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa was the international law of coexistence.’ Ibid at 779. 
43 ‘[...] as an international lawyer will know, when compared to other parts of the international law of 
cooperation, there is nothing new about direct effect and nothing innovative about precedence.’ Ibid 
787. 
44 Thus, Spiermann notes in relation to the doctrine of Union law direct effects that, ‘[b]y neglecting 
the international law of co-operation, the Court ended up with a narrow idea of international law, 
which explains how the Court could assume that international law is unfamiliar with the idea of direct 
effect and the involvement of the individual.’  Ibid 779. 
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international law principles and one which can account fully for the features of the 
Union legal order explored above.  
 
The international law obligations found in the Treaties then have been presented by 
the Court, not as a limitation on and corresponding transfer of domestic sovereignty 
that automatically takes precedence over domestic law, but instead as effects that 
occur strictly within the context of (competing) domestic legal demands. It is this 
engagement with domestic legal concerns by the Court of Justice that is remarkable, 
in Spiermann’s view, from a (true) international law perspective. The Treaties have 
never been used as a platform to challenge failures by the Member States to meet the 
obligations arising as a matter of international law to positively promote the aims that 
they contain.45 The Court’s approach has rather secured the co-operation of domestic 
courts in expressing these demands. This in turn has promoted the acceptance of 
Union requirements by domestic institutional actors generally and served to manage 
conflicts between Union and domestic governmental activities as well as ‘internal’ 





How do these conclusions assist in understanding the role of the Court of Justice as 
a court of international jurisdiction charged with promoting the values of the 
Union? I have argued that two essentially competing current have informed the 
Court’s articulation of Union law demands. The first concerns the legal 
commitments present as a matter of international law within the Union Treaty 
agreements. The Union Treaties represent a binding commitment under 
international law to profoundly restructure of Member States’ governance around 
the ideals of an integrated European Union. The second concerns the fact that the 
full realisation of the objectives contained n the Treaties cannot realistically be 
achieved through the immediate assertion of legal demands alone given that even a 
limited expression of the overall Treaty objectives entails an acceptance of 
supranational legal authority previously unknown within the Member States.   
 
The Court of Justice has therefore evolved the principle of Union law supremacy and 
hence the values of European integration through a consistently creative expression 
                                                 
45 In this regard Spiermann notes that the Court has tended to focus on discriminatory practices as 
constitutive of the economic freedoms, as opposed to barriers to trade that may not be discriminatory 
(although in recent years that Court has increasingly allowed challenges to substantive impediments 
to trade that are not directly discriminatory, maintaining however the requirement that they must 
operate in an indirectly discriminatory manner towards goods / workers / services from other States 
so maintaining a necessary cross border element). He notes in this regard that ‘[t]he content of a ban 
on nationality discrimination is purely negative, saying that the state is not allowed to treat aliens in 
any way worse than its own national. The EEC Treaty thereby opened a door. But in order to 
generate a real opportunity for aliens to go through that door, it was arguably necessary, or at least 
conducive to the objective of making a common market to supplement the negative ban on 
discrimination with various positive principles; or to put it more crudely, to offer the aliens a pat on 
the back when they appeared on the doorstep.’ Ibid 781-2.  
46 Either internally within Member States or in the relationship between the Union and the Member 
States. See on these issues, R Rawlings, ‘Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and Ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union (Part One)’ [1994] PL 214; A M Burley and W Mattli, ‘Europe before 
the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’ (1993) 47 International Organization 45; K J 
Alter, ‘Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the European Court of 
Justice’ (1998) 52 International Organization 121; D Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialisation of 
British Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). 
 VOLUME 5  EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
 118 
of its jurisdiction. Domestic courts have been persuaded to cede a ‘corresponding’ 
jurisdiction – to decide the limits and qualification of the supremacy of Union law – 
to the Court. This has paradoxically provided domestic courts with a derivative 
Union jurisdiction that embraces the Court’s reading of the supremacy doctrine, 
empowering domestic judicial actors to a degree that arguably redefines the 
separation of powers amongst domestic governmental branches in favour of the 
judiciary.47 In sum, the Court’s exercise of an international law jurisdiction has 
triggered a constitution restructuring of domestic judicial authority.  
 
Understanding the Union order as one of international law explains the ideal 
possibilities found in the Treaties as guiding factors in relation to Union 
institutional practices. The Treaties provide a perennial invitation to the Member 
States and Union institutions to pursue the ideal of an integrated Europe and to 
enhance and develop their commitment to a Kantian vision of European legal 
ordering that this commitment implies.48 The almost unlimited potential of the 
Union project to effect, as a matter of the international law, an institutional 
restructuring of the Member States allied to the commitments signed up to in the 
Treaties has meant that the Court has necessarily developed the ideals of European 
integration in a qualified and limited fashion.  
                                                 
47 M Amstutz, ‘Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning’ (2005) 11 ELJ 
766.  
48 ‘According to Kant, the states must finally enter into a cosmopolitan constitution due to the 
constant wars and “form a state which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler, but 
a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right.’ J Př ibáň , ‘The Juridification of 
European Identity, its Limitations and the Search of EU Democratic Politics’ (2009) 16 
Constellations 44 citing I Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: “This may be true in Theory but it does not 
apply in Practice”’ in G H Reiss (ed), H.B.Nisbet (trans), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1971) 90.  
